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This paper studies the relationship between the governance mechanisms and the market 
valuation of publicly listed firms in China empirically. We construct measures for corporate 
governance mechanisms and measures of market valuation for all publicly listed firms on the 
two stock markets in China by using data from the firm’s annual reports. We then investigate 
how the market-valuation variables are affected by the corporate governance variables while 
controlling for a number of factors commonly considered in market valuation analysis. A 
corporate governance index is also constructed to summarize the information contained in the 
corporate governance variables. The index is found to have statistically and economically 
significant effect on market valuation. The analysis indicates that investors pay a significant 
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The Asian financial crisis has rekindled worldwide interest in the issue of corporate 
governance. In recent years, pushing for higher governance standard has become a regular 
campaign with the participation of an increasing number of parties: academics, media, 
regulatory authorities, corporations, institutional investors, international organizations, 
shareholder rights watchdogs, and etc.
1Numerous initiatives have also been proposed by 
Asian countries to enhance their corporate governance practice, for example, new 
listing/disclosure rules, mandatory training for board directors, enforced codes of governance, 
and etc. International organizations are also very keen on governance issues. The 
International Monetary Fund has demanded that governance improvements should be 
included in its debt relief program. In 1998, the Organization of Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) issued its influential OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, 
which are intended to assist member and non-member countries in their efforts to evaluate 
and improve the legal, institutional and regulatory framework for better corporate governance. 
In addition, private companies, such as Standard & Poor, California Public Employees’ 
Retirement Pension System (Calpers), CLSA, and McKinsey, are also calling for sweeping 
reforms of governance practice in emerging economies. 
Corporate governance has also gained unparalleled importance in China.  The 
Chinese government opened stock exchanges in the early 1990s in order to raise capital and 
improve operating performance for state-owned enterprises (SOEs). In fewer than 12 years, 
China’s stock markets have grown into the eighth largest in the world with market 
capitalization of over US$500 billion. Chinese companies, especially SOEs, have benefited 
tremendously from the rapid growth in issuance and general public’s enthusiasm on equity 
market. Meanwhile, the regulations over stock markets have been evolving to address the 
tradeoff between growth and control: a liberal approach that will lead to fast growth versus a 
controlled approach that will lead to slower growth. Even though issuance approval, pricing 
and placement systems have been significantly liberalized, they are still tightly controlled 
compared to other Asian markets. As controlled as it is, poor governance practices are still 
rampant among the Chinese listed companies. For example, several listed companies have 
                                                 
1 A recent research by McKinsey finds that articles featuring ‘corporate governance’ in major international 
economics/finance newspapers or magazines, such as Financial Times, Asian Wall Street Journal, Far-East 
Economic Review, etc, have increased 10 fold from pre-crisis 96-97 to 2001-2001 (see, “Governance in Asia”, 
McKinsey & Company, 2002). In academics, the rebirth has spawned a voluminous body of research on 
governance related issues, especially in emerging markets. 2 
been placed on the spotlight due to their poor governance practices. In 2001, the largest 
shareholder of Meierya, a one-time profitable listed company, colluded with other related 
parties and collectively embezzled US$ 44.6 million, 41% of the listed company’s total 
equity; in the same year, Sanjiu Pharma’s largest shareholder extracted US$ 301.9 million, 
96% of the listed company’s total equity.
2 
While Chinese companies, especially the SOEs, acquire a huge amount of capital 
from the public through either the banking system or the capital market, they remain 
extremely inefficient. For example, recent official statistics suggest that about one-third of all 
SOEs are loss-makers, another third either break even or are plagued with implicit losses, 
while the remaining one-third are marginally profitable. Ineffective governance system has 
been widely believed as the root cause of corporate China's lackluster performance. 
Improving corporate governance is one of the most important tasks of China’s further reform.   
To improve corporate governance, the government obviously has an important role to 
play. It should strengthen laws that protect shareholder interests and beef up enforcement of 
such laws and regulations. It is also important for the firms to take action on voluntary basis. 
The question, however, is: Do the firms have incentives to do so? This depends on the answer 
to the next question: Does a firm’s corporate governance practice have a positive effect on its 
market value? If the answer is yes, then firms will have incentives to improve their 
governance, because by doing so, they increase their market value and reduce their future 
cost of investment. This paper attempts to answer this question empirically.   
The answer to the question is not obvious. For a firm’s corporate governance practice 
to have a positive effect on its market value, two conditions need to be satisfied. The first is 
that good governance increases the returns to shareholders of the firm and the second is that 
the stock market is sufficiently efficient so that the share prices reflect the fundamental values. 
These conditions are most likely to be valid in mature markets, but it is by no means clear 
they are also valid in emerging markets. In fact, many people believe that share prices on 
China’s stock markets are purely driven by speculative activities and bear no relationship to 
the fundamentals of the firms. 
Practitioners seem to believe that good governance does increase the firm’s market 
valuation. Recently, McKinsey has conducted a series of surveys on institutional investors 
and private equities with investment focus on emerging markets and found that 80% of them 
                                                 
2 Liu and Lu (2002) finds that majority of Chinese listed companies manage their earnings as a response to a 
variety of regulatory loopholes. However, the incentives are stronger for firms with poorer governance practice. 3 
are willing to pay a premium to well-governed firms.
3 Several other studies have also 
documented a positive correlation between performance measures and the governance level.
4 
In this paper, we plan to conduct a systematic study of this issue for publicly listed firms in 
China; we perform econometric analysis of the effects of corporate governance practices on 
the market valuation of the firms based on data from the firms’ annual reports (as opposed to 
survey data) about actual corporate governance practices of all publicly listed firms in China. 
We will investigate how the firm’s Tobin’s q values and their market-to-book ratios are 
determined by the corporate governance practices of these firms while controlling for a 
number of variables that are typically used in the studies of market valuations of firms. In our 
analysis, we will pay particular attention to an important characteristic of China’s firms, 
namely the dominance of state-owned shares.   
In order to help policy makers and investors evaluate the relative quality of 
governance of the listed firms, we also develop a corporate governance index, called the G 
index, for China’s stock markets. Such an index should summarize the information contained 
in variables measuring various governance mechanisms adopted by the firms in the most 
efficient way. For this purpose, we conduct principal component analysis of the corporate 
governance variables and define the corporate governance index as the first principal 
component of these variables. We find that this index affects the market valuation of the firms 
in both statistically and economically significant ways. In evaluating the economic 
significance of the effect of the corporate governance index on market valuation, we find that 
investors in China pay significant premium to well-governed firms.   
There is a large body of literature studying issues related to corporate governance in 
China. For example, Qian (1995) is one of the first to offer a comprehensive discussion of 
corporate governance issues in China. Groves et al (1994) and Li (1997) present evidence 
that improved incentives in the reform process increase the productivity of the firms. Xu 
(2000) and Shirley and Xu (2001), on the other hand, show empirically that performance 
contracts are not very effective. Qian (1996) and Che and Qian (1998) emphasize the 
important role of government in corporate governance. Zheng, Liu, and Bigsten (1998), Xu 
and Wang (1999), Zhang, Zhang, and Zhao (2001), Li and Wu (2002), and Tian (2002) all 
investigate the impact of state-ownership on enterprise performance. Among them, Xu and 
Wang (1999) and Tian (2002) are most closely related to ours because both of them are 
empirical studies based on stock market data from China. Our contribution is that our study 
                                                 
3  McKinsey Surveys on International Institutional Investors and Private Equities, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002. 
4  For example, see “Saints and sinners: who’s got religion?”, CLSA Emerging Markets, 2001. 4 
considers a comprehensive list of corporate governance mechanisms and their impacts on the 
market valuation of the firms. We also construct a corporate governance index based on our 
list of governance mechanisms. Furthermore, our study shed light on the relative importance 
of various governance mechanisms in enhancing the market valuation of the firms.   
Most of the empirical literature on the relationship between corporate governance and 
firm performance in other countries focuses on a particular aspect of governance, such as board 
characteristics (Millstein and MacAvoy, 1998, and Bhagat and Black, 1999), shareholders’ 
activism (Karpoff, Malatesta, and Walking, 1996, and Carleton, Nelson, and Weisbach, 1998), 
compensation to outside directors (Bhagat, Carey, and Elson, 1999), anti-takeover provisions 
(Sundaramurthy, Mahoney, and Mahoney, 1997), investor protection (La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 2002), and so on. Recently, several papers study the 
effects of general corporate governance practices on firm value, primarily in emerging 
markets. Most of them either use a small single-country sample (Black, 2001, and Gompers, 
Ishii, and Metrick, 2001) or multi-country samples that contain only the largest firms in each 
country (Durnev and Kim, 2002, and Klapper and Love, 2002). Our paper is closest in sprit to 
the study by Black, Jang, and Kim (2002) on Korea firms in the sense that both study a full 
cross section of all listed firms in the respective market. In China, given the strong influence of 
various levels of government in determining the governance practices of listed firms, often on 
arbitrary basis, we believe that the endogeneity problem in estimating the effect of governance 
practices on firm valuation is not important.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the theoretical framework of 
corporate governance and summarizes major governance mechanisms. Section 3 discusses 
the variables used in our empirical study of the relationship between the governance 
mechanisms and market valuations of firms. Section 4 conducts the econometric analysis, 
constructs the corporate governance index, and assesses the magnitude of the effect of the 
governance index on market valuation. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2.  Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
 
Over three hundred years ago, in his masterwork “The Wealth of Nations”, Adam Smith 
raised the issue of the separation of ownership and stewardship in joint-stock corporations. It 
was therefore suggested that a set of effective mechanisms should be in place to resolve the 
conflict of interests between firm owners and managers. Modern academic literature on 5 
corporate governance stems from the seminal book by Berle and Means (1932), who argued 
that, in practice, managers of a firm pursued their own interests rather than the interests of 
shareholders. The contractual nature of the firm and the principal-agent problem highlighted 
by Berle and Means led to the development of the agency approach to corporate finance. 
Over the years, in particular in the last quarter century, there has been rapid growth in both 
theoretical and empirical studies in this area.   
The agency approach to corporate governance attempts to provide answers to the key 
question – “How can shareholders ensure that non-owner managers pursue their interests?” 
(see Allen and Gale, 2001). However, in recent years, another form of conflict of interests – 
controlling shareholders taking actions that are for their own benefits at the expense of 
minority shareholders – has drawn much attention. As La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and 
Shleifer (1998) assert, “…the central agency problem in large corporations around the world 
is that of restricting expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling shareholders…” 
Such expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling shareholders takes a variety of 
forms, such as excessive executive compensation, loan guarantees for, and transfer pricing 
between, related companies, dilutive share issues, etc. Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
and Shleifer (2000) use the term “tunneling” to describe the transfer of resources out of firms 
for the benefits of their controlling shareholders. Much evidence emerging during the Asian 
financial crisis shows that “tunneling” is a very serious agency problem in emerging markets. 
The recent debacles of Enron, Worldcom, and Global Crossing convince people that 
“tunneling” is also possible even in developed economies. 
Taking various forms of agency problems into account, corporate governance has a 
new and more comprehensive meaning. As suggested by Dennis and McConnell (2002), 
“ …corporate governance is the set of mechanisms – both institutional and market based – 
that induce the self interested controllers of a company (those that make decisions regarding 
how the company will be operated) to make decisions that maximize the value of the 
company to its owners (suppliers of capital)…” Practitioners seem to share the same view. 
For example, TIAA-CREF defines corporate governance as “…the set of mechanisms that 
maintain an appropriate balance between the rights of shareholders… and the needs of the 
board and management to direct and manage the corporation’s affairs.”   
Thus, good corporate governance consists of a set of mechanisms that assure suppliers 
of finance get an adequate return on their investment. Having said that, our next question 
naturally arises: what are the set of mechanisms that should be in place to govern a company? 
There are two competing views: market based governance model popular in US and UK 6 
vis-à-vis control based model common in emerging economies, Japan and the continental 
Europe. The market based governance model has the characteristics of an independent board, 
dispersed ownership, transparent disclosure, active takeover markets, and well-developed 
legal infrastructure. The control model, however, emphasizes the values of insider board, 
concentrated ownership structure, limited disclosure, reliance on family finance and the 
banking system, etc. Although academic research up to date has yielded mixed results 
regarding the relative superiority of the two models, more developing countries seem to favor 
the market-based model. 
In this paper, we do not intend to render judgment as to which of the two models is 
better in the context of China’s capital markets. Instead, we choose to focus on a set of 
corporate governance mechanisms and assess their relations with the market valuation of 
China’s listed companies. We also come up with an overall governance score based on the set 
of mechanisms.   
Broadly speaking, there are two types of mechanisms that help resolve the two sets of 
conflicts: between owners and managers, and between controlling shareholders and minority 
shareholders. The first type consists of internal mechanisms (e.g., ownership structure, 
executive compensations, board of directors, financial disclosure), while the second are 
external mechanisms (e.g., external takeover market, legal infrastructure, protection of 
minority shareholders, etc.). In this paper, we consider and assess each of them.
5 
 
2.1 Internal Mechanisms   
 
There are four internal governance mechanisms: board of directors, executive compensation, 
ownership structure, and financial transparency. 
 
(1) The board of directors 
It is argued that the board of directors is the first instrument through which 
shareholders can exert influence on the behavior of managers in order to ensure that the 
company is run in their interests. It is also argued that such an influence may not be effective 
when the managers dominate the board. However, the empirical findings on the relationship 
between board composition and firm performance are mixed: (1) Firms with boards 
containing a majority of independent directors do not perform better than firms without such 
                                                 
5 We understand that there are many different governance frameworks. Our framework, however, is similar to 
that used in most of the recent researches on corporate governance (e.g., CSLA, S&P, Allen and Gale, 2001). 7 
boards; (2) A moderate number of inside directors is associated with greater profitability; (3) 
In Japan, although the presence of outside directors on the board has no effect on the 
sensitivity of CEO turnover to either earnings or stock-price performance, concentrated 
equity ownership and ties to a main bank do have a positive effect; and (4) There is a strong 
inverse relationship between CEO turnover and firm performance in some countries. 
 
(2) Executive compensation 
The second mechanism that helps align the interests of the managers and the 
shareholders is appropriately structured managerial compensation. Such compensation can be 
linked to both stock valuations and accounting based performance measures. Although most 
of the empirical studies are constrained by data availability, the limited finding seems to 
suggest that there is a positive relationship between executive pay and performance in the US, 
Germany and Japan. 
 
(3) Ownership structure 
It is believed that one of the most important ways through which a firm maximizes its 
value is through well-designed ownership structure of the firm’s shares. Concentrated equity 
ownership can be bad for the governance of the firm since it gives the largest shareholders 
too much discretionary powers of using firm resources in ways that serve their own interest at 
the expense of other shareholders. That is, concentrated ownership may accentuate the 
“tunneling” problem we mentioned earlier. Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000) find that 
cross-holding and pyramidal ownership have been common in Asian economies. One 
consequence of such ownership arrangement is that the controlling shareholders are able to 
obtain more control at minimal capital expense, which makes “tunneling” much easier. 
Although cross-holding, pyramidal schemes, and deviations from one-share-one-vote are not 
common in China, listed companies normally have one ultimate owner who holds a 
significant percent of total shares.
6 The existence of such a controlling shareholder makes 
transferring resources out of listed companies into parent or other related parties’ accounts 
possible. Several recently disclosed corporate scandals in China’s capital markets were all 
about unconstrained large shareholders misusing firm resources. On the other hand, 
ownership concentration may also have some positive effects. If ownership starts out to be 
very dispersed, the emergence of a large shareholder may help overcome the free-rider 
                                                 
6 As we will show in table 1, the largest shareholder in Chinese listed companies on average holds 45.3% of 
total shares. 8 
problem among shareholders in monitoring the managers. This effect is probably negligible 
in China because ownership is seldom very dispersed there. The second positive effect of 
ownership concentration becomes significant when the degree of concentration is very high. 
Since tunneling is usually inefficient for the firm as a whole, if the shareholding of the largest 
shareholder is very large and therefore there is high degree of congruence between his 
interest and the firm’s interest, then the largest shareholder may have very little incentive to 
engage in inefficient tunneling. In summary, the relationship between firm performance and 
ownership concentration is expected to be complicated. Increasing ownership concentration 
from a very low level may help overcome the free-rider problem among shareholders and 
therefore has a positive effect. Further increase in ownership concentration may have a 
negative effect as it reduces the constraint from other shareholders on tunneling. As 
ownership concentration approaches 100 percent, the effect becomes positive again because it 
reduces the largest shareholder’s incentive for tunneling. In China, the second effect is most 
likely to be dominant and the first one is probably negligible.   
 
  (4) Financial transparency and adequate information disclosure 
There is no doubt that financial transparency and adequate information disclosure are 
of ultimate importance in all countries, particularly developing ones. Managers play a vital 
role in securing the interests of not only the existing owners but also potential investors. 
Honest managers will attempt to provide sufficient, accurate and timely information 
regarding the firm’s operations, financial status, and external environment.   
 
2.2. External Mechanisms 
 
(1) The market for corporate control 
It is generally believed that the existence of an active market for corporate control is 
essential for efficient allocation of resources. It allows inefficient managers to be removed 
and replaced with able managers who can gain control of large amounts of resources in a 
short period of time. The market for corporate control can operate in three ways: proxy 
contests, friendly mergers and hostile takeovers. 
Proxy fights do not usually unseat the existing board of directors successfully because 
share holdings are often dispersed among many shareholders. Friendly mergers and takeovers 
occur in all countries and account for most of the transaction volume that occurs. In some 
developed countries, it ranges from 60% to 90%. Hostile takeovers do occur fairly frequently 9 
in the US and UK, however, much less so in Germany, France and Japan. Empirical studies 
suggest that takeovers in the past did significantly increase the market value of target firms, 
although the increase in value for bidding firms was zero and possibly even negative. Studies 
using accounting data find that changes and improvements in operations can at least partially 
explain takeover premiums. 
  
(2) Legal infrastructure and protection of minority shareholders 
A series of studies by La Porta et al (1997, 1998, 1999, 2002) emphasize the role 
played by the legal framework and legal foundation in disciplining managers and controlling 
shareholders’ opportunistic behaviors. They find that in countries with common law tradition, 
governance standards are generally higher and minority shareholders are relatively better 
protected. In contrast, countries pursuing continental law systems normally have poor 
minority shareholder protection and lower governance standards. Interestingly, they find that 
cross-country differences in equity valuation, cost of capital and magnitude of external 
financing could be explained by a country’s legal origin. Obviously, legal infrastructure is an 
effective external mechanism that assures that investors get a fair return on their investment.   
Chinese listed companies are regulated by a uniform legal system, therefore, this 
mechanism plays little role in explaining cross-sectional differences in governance practices. 
However, it has to be kept in mind that many Chinese companies do have shares listed and 
traded on stock exchanges where different jurisprudences prevail (e.g., H shares, ADRs, etc). 
  
(3) Product market competition 
Another powerful mechanism for solving a variety of agency problems is competition 
in product markets. If the managers of a firm waste resources, the firm will eventually fail in 
product markets. Hence, increased competition reduces managerial slack and may be helpful 
in limiting efficiency losses. The same logic implies that product competition helps curtail the 
“tunneling” activities of the controlling shareholder. 
In sum, good corporate governance helps protect investors and ensures that investors 
get a fair return on their investment. The mechanisms we specified above may be important 
components of good corporate governance. It is important to find out empirically how 
effective these mechanisms are in China’s context. In particular, we are interested in how 
these mechanisms affect the market valuation of the firms.   
 10 
3.  Quantification of Corporate Governance Mechanisms and Market 
Valuation 
 
In this section, we define some variables to quantify some of the corporate governance 
mechanisms we discussed in Section 2. We will also define two variables that represent the 
market valuation of the firms. Summary statistics of these variables will be presented. These 
variables prepare us for the empirical analysis in Section 4.   
 
3.A. Definition of Corporate Governance Variables 
 
(1) Board of directors   
 
(i) ceo_is_top_dir – a dummy variable that equals 1 if the CEO is the chairman or a vice 
chairman of the board of directors and 0 otherwise. 
 
The board of directors in a company should play an important role of monitoring the 
management. Such monitoring function is compromised, when a CEO controls or partially 
controls the board. Our measure, ceo_is_top_dir, therefore, is expected to have negative 
impact on a company’s market valuation. 
 
(ii) out_ratio - the percentage of outsider directors in a company’s board 
 
It is defined as the ratio of the number of directors who do not receive compensation 
from the company to the total number of directors. Paid directors are often members of the 
management team who are delegated by the controlling shareholder. If they dominate the 
board, the board is not expected to play an effective monitoring role.   
 
(2) Executive compensation 
 
Stock options are rare in China. Also, the information on executive pay is not 
complete, and in majority cases inaccessible. However, we come up with the following 
alternative variable to capture the alignment of interests between the managers and the 
shareholders. 11 
 
(iii) top5 - the percentage of the shareholding held by the top executives   
 
We define the top executive as the CEO, the executive vice presidents, the 
chairperson and the vice chairpersons of the board of directors. top5 measures the top 
managers’ economic interests in a company.  The interests of the top managers are better 
aligned with the interests of shareholders if they have more stakes in the firm.     
 
(3) Ownership variables 
 
(iv) top1 - shareholding of the largest shareholder     
 
We define top1 as the percentage of shares held by the largest shareholder. We 
employ this variable to measure the largest shareholder’s interest in a company and also the 
largest shareholder’s power in the board. As we discussed in Section 2, we expect the 
relationship between a firm’s market valuation and the variable top1 to be U-shaped and to be 
negative if we restrict the relationship to be linear. 
 
(v) parent – a dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm has a parent company and 0 otherwise 
 
If the largest shareholder of a listed company is a firm, the scope for tunneling is 
wider. There are many more channels for a company than an individual to tunnel. The parent 
company can expropriate other shareholders of the concerned firm through various business 
dealings between them, or connected transactions. The most commonly observed are loan 
guarantees for related companies, manipulated transfer prices, the dumping of non- 
performing assets from parent company to listed company. 
 
(4) Financial transparency 
 
We do not have a good measure for financial transparency. Most listed companies in 
China are audited by local accounting firms and there is no reliable information about which 
accounting firm is more reputable. In spite of the fact that a number of companies have shares 
listed on Hong Kong or New York stock exchanges and therefore have then-big 5 firms audit 
their financial statements, foreign auditors seldom have access to the information about those 12 
listed companies’ domestic operations – due to very complicated financing and ownership 
arrangements. 
 
(5) The market for corporate control 
 
(vi) cstr2_10 - concentration of shareholding in the hands of the second to the tenth largest 
shareholders  
 
It is defined as the natural logarithm of the sum of squares of the percentage points of 
shareholding by the 2
nd to the 10
th largest shareholders. This variable should have a positive 
effect through three channels. First, large shareholders other than the largest one are obstacles 
to the tunneling activities by the largest shareholder, since these shareholders have incentives 
to monitor and restrain the largest shareholder. Second, they enhance the efficiency of the 
market for corporate control. When the management under-performs, these large shareholders 
can either initiate a fight for corporate control or help an outsider’s fight for control. Third, 
these large shareholders also serve as monitors of the management. Overall, the higher is the 




(6) Legal framework and protection of minority shareholders 
 
(vii) hbshare – a dummy variable that equals 1 if a company has H shares traded in the Hong 
Kong Stock Exchange or B shares traded in the Shanghai or Shenzhen stock exchange; and 0 
otherwise 
 
As explained before, the Chinese listed companies are uniformly regulated by Chinese 
jurisprudences. However, companies that have issued H shares traded on Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange or B shares mainly open to foreign investors in domestic stock exchanges must 
adopt international accounting standards. This dummy variable is used as a proxy for the 
effect of legal environment in enforcing corporate governance. 
                                                 
7 Using a sample of firms under “special treatment,” Bai, Liu and Song (2002) estimate that increased 
competition for the control over a firm triggered by the designation of the “special treatment” status results in an 
average abnormal return of 29%. They also find that the abnormal return is positively correlated to cstr2_10, 
implying that concentration of shareholding in the hands of the second to the tenth largest shareholders enhances 
competition for the control over the firm and hence increases its market valuation.   13 
 
  (7) Product market competition variable 
 
We do not have a good measure for this mechanism. Even if we did, its effect on 
market valuation would be ambiguous. On the one hand, product market competition 
enhances corporate governance. On the other hand, product market competition erodes the 
profitability of the firm.   
 
(vii) so_top1 – a dummy variable that equals 1 if the government is the controlling 
shareholder and 0 otherwise 
 
Finally, in addition to the above seven measures of corporate governance derived 
from conventional economic theory, we also consider one additional measure – the dummy 
variable that measures whether the controlling shareholder is the government or not.
8 It is 
believed that government may have goals such as maintaining employment and social 
stability rather than profit-maximization. The controlling government may use the listed 
company as a vehicle to meet these other policy goals that may conflict with shareholders’ 
interests (see Bai, Li, Tao, and Wang, 2000). Additionally, it has been argued that soft budget 
constraint is a major problem facing many SOEs in transition economies (see Dewatripont, 
Maskin, and Roland, 1998, for a survey). Therefore, we believe that governments as 
controlling shareholders have negative effect on the firms’ market valuation.   
 
3.B. Market Valuation 
 
Since our goal is to study the impacts of corporate governance mechanisms on the market 
valuations of the firms, we also need to define measures of market valuation. The following 
two measures are used:   
 
(1) Tobin’s q, a measure widely used to measure the valuation of listed company;   
(2) Market/Book ratio, a ratio of market value to book value of total assets. 
 
Note that these measures are normalized with respect to the size of the firm and therefore 
                                                 
8 The so-called state-controlling shareholder also includes legal-person shares controlled by various level of 
governments. 14 
should not depend on the size of the firm in trivial ways. Details about the variable 
definitions are given in the appendix. 
One difficulty with these definitions is that a large proportion of shares of the listed 
firms in China cannot be freely traded and therefore do not have market prices. There is then 
no consensus way to compute the total market value of the firms. One straightforward way of 
doing it is to use the price of the tradable shares to represent the price of the non-tradable 
shares. Variables Tq (or Q) and MB are defined this way. However, this method tends to 
overstate the market valuation of the firm, as the non-tradable shares should have lower price 
than the tradable ones. Chen and Xiong (2002) find that the non-tradable state-owned shares 
and legal-person shares in China on average have a 70%-80% illiquidity discount when they 
are traded on informal markets. Following their findings, we define two more sets of 
valuation measures. Tq_70 and MB_70 are computed by taking a 70% discount on the 
non-tradable shares and Tq_80 and MB_80 are computed by taking an 80% discount. These 
additional measures should better reflect the market valuation of China’s listed firms.   
 
3.C. Summary Statistics 
 
Our sample of study includes all listed companies on both the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange during the year of 2000. We eliminate those firms 
with missing data for the eight variables and the remaining sample consists of 1004 firms, 
representing more than 95% of listed firms on the two exchanges. The data source is China 
Stock Market & Accounting Research Database (CSMAR), compiled according to the format 
of  CRSP and Compustat by Hong Kong Polytech University and GTA Information 
Technology Company Limited in Shenzhen. 
  Table I reports the sample statistics. In panel A, we present the summary statistics of 
the eight corporate governance variables. It is interesting to note a number of features about 
the governance structure of Chinese firms: (1) More than a third of CEOs in China’s listed 
companies are also the chairman or a vice chairman of the board of directors, blurring the 
monitoring role supposedly played by the board of directors; (2) The proportion of the 
number of outsider directors on the board for the sample companies is surprisingly high, with 
a mean of 48.4% and a standard deviation of 27.4%; (3) Top managers typically own very 
little of their companies’ shares. The mean of top5 variable is 0.02% with standard deviation 
of 0.1432%; (4) On average, the largest shareholder in each firm holds a significantly large 
portion of shares. Note that the mean of the top shareholder’s holding, top1, is 45.3%, with 15 
highest value more than 88%; (5) A large majority of the publicly listed firms in China 
(78.7%) have a parent company. This can be seen from the mean for the dummy variable 
parent, which is 0.787; (6) there is a big variation of concentration of shareholding in the 
hands of the second to the tenth largest shareholders in China. The mean and the standard 
deviation for the concentration of the second to the tenth largest shareholders, cstr2_10, are 
3.20 and 2.80, with lowest at -6.53 to highest 7.27; (7) Dual listing or multiple listing is not 
common for Chinese firms, with only less than 10% of them having the privilege; and (8) a 
large majority of companies, about 57% are controlled by the government. 
The summary statistics of the valuation variables are given in Panel B of Table I. It is 
clear from the table that, when non-tradable shares are not discounted, the Chinese publicly 
listed firms, on average, are highly valued by shareholders. The mean values of each of the 
two valuation variables, 3.619 and 4.043, are significantly higher than the international norm. 
However, when non-tradable shares are discounted, the adjusted Tobin’s q and the 
market/book ratio are in the range of 1.8 to 2.0, which seem to be more comparable with 
those in other major stock markets. 
 
4. Empirical Results on Corporate Governance and Market Valuation 
 
In this section, we carry out our econometric analysis. First, we investigate the effects of the 
corporate governance mechanisms on the market valuation of the firms. We will use six 
different measures of market valuation for our analysis. Second, we use the principle 
component method to construct a corporate governance index – the G index, and consider the 
relationship between the G index and the market valuation. Finally, we compare the average 
market valuation of each quintile of the firms ranked by the G index. This exercise gives us 
some idea about the magnitude of the corporate governance premiums when only one index 
is used to measure the level of corporate governance. Some international comparison is also 
offered.  
 
4.A. Regression Results 
 
Table II reports regression results of market valuation variables on the 8 variables used to 
measure the internal as well as the external mechanisms of corporate governance for China’s 
listed companies. The first regression is done by regressing Tobin’s q on the 8 variables, with 16 
the size, the leverage ratio, the capital-sales ratio, the operation income-sales ratio, and 
industry dummies (according to CSRC’s classification with 16 industries) as control variables 
(the details of these control variables are given in the appendix). These control variables are 
typical variables used in corporate valuation studies (see, for example, Cho (1998), and Joh 
(forthcoming)). By controlling these variables, we isolate the impact of corporate governance 
variables on market valuation. 
We organize our independent variables according to the corporate governance 
mechanisms discussed in the previous sections. The square term of the variable top1, top1_sq, 
is included because our discussion in Section 2 suggests that the relationship between market 
valuation and the shareholding of the largest shareholder is likely to be non-linear. Eight 
interesting findings are in order. 
First, if a company’s CEO is also a top director (chairman or vice chairman) of the 
board, it might hurt the company’s valuation. Indeed, the coefficient of the variable 
ceo_is_top_dir in this regression is negative although not statistically significant. 
Second, high ratios of outside directors in the board seem to enhance firms’ market 
valuations. The variable out_ratio that measures the proportion of outside directors in the 
board has a positive coefficient in the regression with the significance level at 5%. 
Third, high shareholdings of top managers may not be value enhancing in China; the 
coefficient of the variable top5 in the regression is negative with very small t-value. The 
inclusive result may be due to the fact that shareholdings by the top managers in China’s 
listed companies are negligibly small.   
Fourth, the effect of the shareholding of the largest shareholder on Tobin’s q is 
non-linear. The coefficient of top1 is negative and statistically significant, and the coefficient 
of top1_sq is positive and statistically significant, indicating a U-shaped relation between a 
firm’s market valuation (Tobin’s q) and the shareholding of its largest shareholder. This 
finding is consistent with other studies for China’s listed companies (see Tian 2002).
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Fifth, it is value reducing for a listed firm to have a parent company. The coefficient 
for the dummy variable parent in the regression is negative and statistically significant at the 
5% level. 
Sixth, the higher is the degree of concentration of shareholding among other large 
shareholders, the higher will be the firm’s market valuation. The coefficient for the variable 
cstr2_10 is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. 
                                                 
9 Tian (2002) interprets the observed U-shape relationship with his theory of two hands of the government 
shareholder - grabbing and helping. 17 
Seventh, domestic investors seem to favor firms with cross listing and reward them 
with high valuations. The coefficient of the dummy variable hbshare is positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% level, indicating that the domestic-market valuation of a 
firm is higher when the firm also issues shares open to foreign investors (B-shares) or is listed 
overseas (H-shares).   
Finally, state-controlled firms tend to have lower valuation. In the regression, the 
coefficient of the dummy variable so_top1 is negative and statistically significant at the 10% 
level.  
Among the four control variables, both the size and leverage variables have negative 
relationship with the market valuation measure Q. The other control variables are not 
significant in the regression. The coefficients for industry dummies are not reported to save 
space. 
In the second and the third regressions, we replace Tobin’s q with illiquidity-discount 
adjusted Tobin’s q values, Tq_70 and Tq_80 respectively. The overall results are mostly 
consistent with those from the first regression. The coefficients of the variables out_ratio and 
parent become statistically insignificant although their signs remain the same as in the first 
regression. For the regression on Tq_80, the coefficient of cstr2_10 becomes insignificant but 
remains positive. All the three regressions have relatively high explanatory power as 
R-squares are between 0.36 and 0.41. The control variables of size and leverage have 
negative and significant coefficients. In summary, the results from the three regressions with 
Tobin’s q as dependent variables are mostly consistent with the predictions of the corporate 
governance  theories  outlined  in  Section  2.         
The fourth to the sixth columns of Table II report the results from regressions of 
various measures of market-to-book ratio. The results are generally consistent with those 
regressions with Tobin’s q as the measure of the firm valuation. Notably, the R-square 
remains quite high. To check for the sensitivity of our main results, we also perform the 
regressions by omitting control variables other than the size of the firms. The results are 
reported in Table IIb and they are generally in agreement with the findings reported in Table 
II.   
Before concluding this sub-section, we would like to point out some potential 
problems in interpreting the above results. First, running regressions with 8 regressors could 
encounter the possible problem of multi-collinearity. However, the multi-collinearity problem 
is likely to reduce the significance level of the dependent variables in the regression while the 
coefficients of our regressors are mostly statistically significant. Second, there is a potential 18 
endogeneity problem of the independent variables in the regressions. We argue that most 
variables used in regressions are less likely to be endogenous as most of these variables, for 
example, the ownership and whether the company has a parent or not, were predetermined 
before their listing and quite stable after listing in the stock markets. As the market develops 
and many of these variables are allowed to adjust according to economic considerations, 
further research on this issue would be useful.   
 
4.B. Ranking Methodology 
 
Another objective of this paper is to develop an index to quantify and evaluate the relative 
quality of corporate governance practice for each of the publicly listed companies on 
Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. We have defined some variables that represent 
various corporate governance mechanisms in Section 3 and found that some of these 
variables have significant effects on the market valuation of the firms. In this subsection, we 
combine these variables into one index, called the corporate governance index, or the G index. 
We will investigate the relationship between the G index and the market valuation of the 
firms.  
According to our theoretical analysis in Section 2, we divide the eight variables 
defined in Section 3 into two categories. The first category includes variables that have 
negative impacts on a company’s governance: (1) ceo_is_top_dir, the dummy variable that 
indicates the CEO is the chairman or a vice chairman of the board of directors; (2) top1, the 
shareholding of the largest shareholder; (3) parent, the dummy variable that indicates the firm 
has a parent company; (4) so_top1, the dummy variable that indicates the largest shareholder 
is the state. The theoretical prediction is that the higher is the value of each of these variables, 
the lower should be the level of corporate governance of the firm. 
The second category includes variables that have positive impacts on governance: (1) 
out_ratio, the proportion of outside directors; (2) top5, shareholding by the top five 
executives of the firm; (3) cstr2_10, the degree of concentration of shareholding in the hands 
of the second to the tenth largest shareholders; (4) hbshare, the dummy variable that indicates 
a company has overseas listings. The prediction is that the higher is the value of each of these 
variables, the higher should be the level of corporate governance of the firm. 
Since the above eight variables represent separately the internal and external 
mechanisms of corporate governance, it is important to form a composite measure of 19 
corporate governance for the listed firms. To achieve this goal, we apply the principal 
component analysis (PCA). The PCA allows us to identify linear combinations of the eight 
variables that best represent the variation in the eight variables (see Greene, 1990, pages 
283-285). We define our corporate governance index, or the G index, as the first principal 
component of the PCA.   
Table III gives the factor loadings from the first principal component of the PCA. The 
signs for all variables, except for ceo_is_top_dir, are consistent with our theoretical 
arguments in Section 2. Table III indicates that, among the eight corporate governance 
variables, top1, cstr2_10, out_ratio, so_top1, parent are the more important components in 
the G index. It is interesting to note that except for the variable out_ratio, the remaining four 
variables all capture ownership structure of the listed companies. The other three variables, 
top5, ceo_is_top_dir, and Hbshare are less important components of the G index.   
Having defined the G index, we can now consider its relationship with the market 
valuation of the firms. Panel A of Table IV reports the regression results of the valuation 
measures, the three Tobin’s q values and the three values of the market to book ratio, on the G 
index. All six regressions show a statistically significant (at the 1% level) relationship 
between the corporate governance index and the market valuation. In order to single out the 
importance of governance on valuations, we also control for the industry differences and 
some other variables. Panel B of Table IV reports the regression results with these control 
variables. The coefficient of the G index is still statistically significant at the 1% level in all 
six regressions. These results strongly suggest that better-governed companies in China are 
highly regarded by investors who are willing to pay a premium for high governance standard.   
Besides using the principal component analysis, we have also experimented with 
other ways of combining the eight raw scores into one index, for example, ranking each 
company according to each of the eight variables and then apply the method of equal 
weighting. The results from these other methods are largely consistent with those from the 
principal component analysis reported here.
10  
 
4.C. The Magnitude of the Corporate Governance Premium 
 
In the last subsection, we found that there is statistically significant correlation between the G 
index and the market valuation of firms. In this subsection, we consider the economic 
                                                 
10  The results from using other methods to combining the raw scores are available upon request.   20 
significance of this relationship. To achieve this goal, we divide all sample firms into 
quintiles according to the G index. Group 1 contains 20 percent of the firms with the lowest 
values of the G index while Group 5 contains those with the highest. For each group, we 
calculate the mean, standard deviation, and other summary statistics of each market valuation 
measure.  
Panel A of Table V reports the summary statistics for the variable Tobin’s q in each 
group. It is quite striking that the average Tobin’s q for the lowest ranked firms is 3.060 while 
the average for those highest ranked is 4.475, with the difference being up to 46%. The 
difference in Tobin’s q between the best-governed firms according our index and the average 
is more than 23%. These differences lend us to reach an important conclusion: Investors in 
China are willing to pay a significant premium to better-governed firms. This casts doubt on 
the popular view that the Chinese stock market is full of speculative investors who fail to 
value firms’ fundamentals and their governance structure.   
  Panel B of the Table V shows that except for the differences between groups 2 and 3, 
and 3 and 4, the differences of Tobin’s q amongst other groups are all statistically significant. 
To gain visual appreciation, the corresponding Figure 1 plots the mean values of Tobin’s q for 
these five groups of the firms. The figure clearly shows an upward trend, supporting the idea 
that better-governed firms are associated with higher market valuations.   
Table VI and VII, Figures 2 and 3 report similar pattern for the adjusted Tobin’s q 
measures,  Tq_70, and Tq_80. Both tables suggest that the best-governed companies 
command a premium of up to 63% over the worst governed companies. The results from the 
statistical tests and figures are also similar to those from the unadjusted Tobin’s q.   
Finally, Tables VIII to X and Figures 4-6 report similar results for the measures of the 
market to book ratio as those for Tobin’s q values. The investors seem to be willing to value 
better-governed companies significantly higher than those companies that lag behind others, 
by a margin of 41%, 62% and 67% respectively.   
Having discussed the magnitude of the corporate governance premium in China, it 
would be useful to compare it to its values in other countries. Unfortunately, such a 
comparison is difficult for two reasons. One is that there are very few such studies for they 
require rich data and very substantial amount of work. The other is that the corporate 
governance measures used in the few studies that are available are not uniform due to varied 
data availability, which makes it almost impossible to make meaningful comparison between 
them.  
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) construct a corporate governance index by 21 
considering provisions in the corporate charter, the corporate bylaw, and the state law that 
protect the power of the management. These provisions include ones used to delay hostile 
takeover, restrict voting rights, protect director/officers, and defend takeover. Their 
governance index is defined to be a simple count of these provisions for each firm; the higher 
is the index value, the lower is the level of governance of a firm. The range of the value of the 
index is between 2 and 18, with the median equal to 9 (Table II in their paper). When a firm 
adopts one more such provision, its Tobin’s q on average drops by between 0.02 and 0.11, 
depending on the year (Table VIII of their paper). It is hard to compare the magnitude of the 
corporate governance premium in our study and theirs without making counterfactual 
assumptions. The difference between the average value of Tobin’s q of the top quintile of 
firms and that of the bottom quintile would be between 0.19 and 1.06, depending on the year, 
if the values of the index of all firms were uniformly distributed and Tobin’s q and the 
corporate governance index were perfectly correlated.   
Black, Jang and Kim (2002) construct a corporate governance index for 540 Korea 
companies by using information from a survey conducted by the Korean Stock Exchange. 
They find that an increase in corporate governance index (CG1) by 10 points results in an 
increase of 0.059 in the value of Tobin’s q (Table 4 in their paper). Given that the range of the 
index is 13 to 86, the difference between the average value of Tobin’s q of the top quintile of 
firms and that of the bottom quintile would be 0.26 if the same set of counterfactual 
assumptions as in the last paragraph were made.   
McKinsey (2002) has analyzed the corporate governance situation for selected 
industries in six emerging markets. Table XI presents the finding. The governance premium 
there refers to the effect on the market-to-book ratio of moving from the worst to the best in 
one component of corporate governance. To make our result comparable, we compute our 
single component premiums from Table II by multiplying the coefficient of a corporate 
governance variable by the range of the variable. For most governance components, the 
premium is in the range from 30% to 65% for Chinese industries. Note that our average 
single-component premium is obtained from all industries in China, while the figure in Table 
XI is obtained from selected industries in six economies. 
  
5. Conclusion 
This paper empirically studies the impacts of various corporate governance 
mechanisms on the market valuation of firms. It also constructs a corporate governance index 22 
based on the list of mechanism we consider. Corporate governance premium is computed by 
comparing the average market valuation of the best-governed firms with that of the 
worst-governed firms according to the index.   
We use eight variables to quantify various corporate governance mechanisms. They 
include the largest shareholding, whether the largest shareholder is the government, the 
concentration of shareholding among the second to the tenth largest shareholders, whether the 
firm has a parent company, the ratio of outside directors on the board, whether the CEO is the 
head of the board, whether the firm also issues shares to foreign investors, and the 
shareholding of the five highest executives. We use Tobin’s q and the market-to-book ratio as 
measures of market valuation. In our econometric analysis, we also control for a number of 
variables that are commonly used in the analysis of market valuation of firms.   
We find that the estimated effects of most of the eight variables are consistent with 
theoretical predictions. In particular, high concentration of shareholding among the second to 
the tenth largest shareholders, issuing shares to foreign investors, and high ratio of outside 
investors all have statistically significant and positive effects on market valuation; large 
holding by the largest shareholder, having a parent company, and the largest shareholder 
being the government all have statistically significant and negative effects on market 
valuation.  
We define the corporate governance index as the first principal component of the eight 
variables, which is the linear combination of the eight variables that captures the most 
information contained in them. The coefficients of seven out of the eight variables have the 
signs predicted by the theoretical framework. The index is found to have a statistically and 
economically significant negative effect on market valuation. According to the ranking 
implied by the index, the average market valuation of the top twenty percent of the firms is 
between 41% and 67% higher than that of the bottom twenty percent of the firms, depending 
on the valuation measure used. This represents a significant premium for good corporate 
governance practice.   
Our findings have valuable implications for both the security regulators and listed 
companies in China. It is known that many security regulators in the world, including both 
the developed and developing countries, have recognized the importance of corporate 
governance in enhancing firms’ investment values. They have proposed various ways, known 
as the best practice codes, to improve a firm’s overall governance standard. It is our belief 
that our study sheds light on the relative importance of various corporate governance 
practices and should provide useful information for Chinese regulatory authorities to design 23 
the best practice codes tailored to the Chinese institutional background and current level of 
capital market development. In addition, it also provide useful guide for firms to design their 
corporate governance mechanisms so that they can enhance their market valuation to benefit 
their shareholders and reduce their future investment cost.   24 
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(1) The CEO is the chairman or a vice chairman of the board of directors – ceo_is_top_dir 
dummy. 
 
(2) The proportion of outsider directors – out_ratio– the ratio of the number of directors 
without pay with respect to the total number of directors.   
 
(3) Shareholding by the top five officials of the firm – top5. 
 
(4) Shareholding percentage of the largest shareholder – top1. 
 
(5) The firm has a parent company – parent dummy, equals one if the firm has a parent 
company, zero otherwise 
 
(6) Concentration of shareholding in the hands of the second to the tenth largest 
shareholders – cstr2_10 = sum of squares of the percentage shareholding by the 2
nd to the 10
th 
largest shareholders, and then take logarithm. 
 
(7) hbshare, dummy, equals one if the firm also issues foreign shares (B&H) 
 
(8) so_top1, dummy, equals one if the controlling shareholder is also a state share owner. 
 
(9) top1_sq, the square of top1.  
 
(10) Tobin’s q
11  is defined as 
BVTA
BVCA BVCL BVINV BVLTD BVPS MVCS
Tq
− + + + +
=  
Where  
MVCS = the market value of the firm’s common stock shares; 
BVPS = the book value of the firm’s preferred stocks; 
BVLTD = the book value of the firm’s long-term debt; 
BVINV = the book value of the firm’s inventories; 
BVCL = the book value of the firm’s current liabilities; 
BVCA = the book value of the firm’s current assets; and 
                                                 
11 Following Chung, K. H. and S. W. Pruitt (1994) “A Simple Approximation of Tobin’s q.”  Financial 
Management 23, 70 – 74. 
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BVTA = the book value of the firm’s total assets. 
As there is no preferred stock in China, the above formula reduces to: 
BVTA
BVCA BVCL BVINV BVLTD MVCS
Tq
− + + +
=  
 The  Tq_70, and Tq_80 are Tobin’s q adjusted by illiquidity discount of 70% and 80% 
respectively. Specifically, we multiply the amount of liquidable shares by the market price 
and the amount of illiquidable shares by 30% and 20% of the market share price respectively 
to obtain the value of equity in the Tobin’s q formula. 
 
(11) Market/Book ratio (MB). This variable is defined as following: 
BVTA
BVCL BVLTD MVCS
asset total of value Book







 The  MB_70, and MB_80 are similarly defined as in Tobin’s q. 
 
(12) ln(sales): natural logarithm of main operation income, as a proxy of firm size. 
 
(13) ln(total assets): natural logarithm of the book value of total assets. 
 
(14) Leverage ratio is defined as the ratio of book value of debt/total asset 
 
(15) Capital/Sales ratio is calculated as the book value of total tangible asset divided by   
 total  sales 
(16) Operation Income/Sales ratio is defined as the ratio of operation profit divided by 
 total  sales 
 
(17) Industry dummies are defined according to Chinese Security Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC)’s industry classification. All listed firms are classified into 
sixteen industries and we take the agriculture industry as the base industry.     31 
Table I. Summary Statistics   
 
This table presents the summary statistics of the governance and valuation variables, which 
are defined in the appendix.   
 




Obs Mean  Median S.  D.  Min.  Max. 
ceo_is_top_dir  1004 0.334  0  0.472  0  1 
out_ratio  1004 0.484  0.545  0.274  0  1 
top5  1004 2.048E-4  3.45E-5 1.443E-3  0  0.037 
top1  1004  45.300 44.995 17.615  2.140 88.580 
parent  1004 0.787  1  0.410  0  1 
cstr2_10  1004 3.204  3.780  2.796  -6.526  7.273 
hbshare  1004 0.097  0  0.296  0  1 




Panel B: Valuation Variables   
 
 
Variable  No. of Obs  Mean  Median  S. D.  Min.  Max. 
TQ 1004 3.619  3.202  1.987  0.880  17.992 
Tq_70 1004  2.049  1.787  1.086  0.500  8.928 
Tq_80 1004  1.824  1.593  0.975  0.396  8.046 
MB 1004  4.043  3.608  1.997  1.300  18.370 
MB_70 1004  2.046  1.806  1.125  0.381  8.923 




Table II, Regression Results of Valuation on Individual Governance Variables 
(with size, capital intensity, operating income margin,   
leverage, and industry dummies controlled)   
 
The table reports estimated coefficients, t-statistics (in parentheses), and adjusted-R
2’s from 




  TQ  Tq_70 Tq_80 MB  MB_70  MB_80 
ceo_is_top_dir  -0.1248 -0.0497 -0.0390 -0.1192 -0.0441 -0.0334 
  (1.184) (0.835) (0.724) (1.140) (0.754) (0.632) 
out_ratio  0.3965**  0.1094 0.0684 0.3833**  0.0962 0.0552 
  (2.106) (1.029) (0.711) (2.051) (0.920) (0.585) 
top5  -9.6105 -0.0843 1.2765  -7.1693 2.3568  3.7177 
  (0.285) (0.004) (0.074) (0.214) (0.126) (0.220) 
top1  -0.0376**  -0.0279*** -0.0265*** -0.0364**  -0.0267*** -0.0253*** 
  (2.457) (3.221) (3.381) (2.396) (3.134) (3.290) 
top1_sq  0.0007*** 0.0003*** 0.0002*** 0.0007*** 0.0003*** 0.0002*** 
  (4.336) (3.168) (2.789) (4.332) (3.156) (2.771) 
parent    -0.2711**  -0.0868 -0.0605 -0.2513*  -0.0670 -0.0407 
  (2.036) (1.154) (0.889) (1.901) (0.906) (0.610) 
cstr2_10  0.1925*** 0.0407*** 0.0190  0.1986*** 0.0468*** 0.0251* 
  (7.535) (2.819) (1.455) (7.829) (3.294) (1.957) 
hbshare  0.7777*** 0.5830*** 0.5552*** 0.7354*** 0.5408*** 0.5130*** 
  (4.495) (5.965) (6.277) (4.282) (5.626) (5.913) 
so_top1 -0.2000*  -0.1130*  -0.1006*  -0.2051**  -0.1182**  -0.1058** 
  (1.904) (1.905) (1.874) (1.968) (2.026) (2.009) 
ln_sales  -0.8261*** -0.4449*** -0.3905*** -0.8408*** -0.4596*** -0.4052*** 
  (17.054) (16.261) (15.770) (17.485) (17.082) (16.684) 
Capital/Sales  0.0184 0.0016 -0.0008  0.0084 -0.0084  -0.0108 
  (1.000) (0.154) (0.085) (0.459) (0.823) (1.172) 
Operation 
Income/Sales 
0.0174 0.0063 0.0047 0.0069 -0.0042  -0.0057 
  (0.934) (0.602) (0.499) (0.373) (0.403) (0.616) 
Leverage  -2.0546*** -0.7167*** -0.5256*** -2.1420*** -1.8041*** -1.6130*** 
  (6.959) (4.297) (3.483) (7.308) (11.000)  (10.896) 
Intercept  20.2755*** 11.5466*** 10.2997*** 21.0068*** 12.2780*** 11.0310*** 
  (18.843) (18.998) (18.726) (19.667) (20.541) (20.447) 
Obs.  No.  1004 1004 1004 1004 1004 1004 
Adjusted R
2  0.411 0.371 0.361 0.426 0.433 0.427 
 
Note: (1) Industrial Dummies have been included but are not reported. 
          (2) *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table IIb, Regression Results of Valuation on Individual Governance Variables 
(with size controlled) 
 
The table reports estimated coefficients, t-statistics (in parentheses), and adjusted-R
2’s from 
regressions of Tobin’s q values and market/book ratio values on individual governance 
variables. 
 
 Tq  Tq_70  Tq_80  MB  MB_70  MB_80 
ceo_is_top_dir  -0.0731 -0.0295 -0.0233 -0.0711 -0.0126 -0.0064 
 (0.660)  (0.480)  (0.421) (0.643) (0.198) (0.112) 
out_ratio  0.3645*  0.1087 0.0722 0.3331*  0.0597 0.0231 
 (1.856)  (0.997)  (0.735) (1.697) (0.528) (0.227) 
top5  21.4873 15.2723 14.3844 25.6752 24.4774 23.5896 
 (0.603)  (0.772)  (0.808) (0.721) (1.195) (1.278) 
top1 -0.0327**  -0.0267***  -0.0259***  -0.0306*  -0.0197**  -0.0189** 
 (2.054)  (3.021)  (3.246) (1.918) (2.151) (2.284) 
top1_sq  0.0007*** 0.0003*** 0.0002*** 0.0007*** 0.0002**  0.0002* 
 (3.906)  (2.952)  (2.630) (3.816) (2.310) (1.939) 
parent  -0.2697*  -0.0934 -0.0682 -0.2481*  -0.0654 -0.0402 
 (1.935)  (1.207)  (0.979) (1.781) (0.816) (0.557) 
cstr2_10  0.2002*** 0.0438*** 0.0215  0.2073*** 0.0504*** 0.0281** 
 (7.467)  (2.944)  (1.603) (7.734) (3.268) (2.021) 
Hbshare  0.5335*** 0.4548*** 0.4435*** 0.4821*** 0.3728*** 0.3616*** 
 (2.973)  (4.565)  (4.942) (2.687) (3.612) (3.889) 
so_top1  -0.4102*** -0.2205*** -0.1934*** -0.4282*** -0.2535*** -0.2264*** 
 (3.477)  (3.367)  (3.279) (3.631) (3.736) (3.704) 
ln_sales  -0.8592*** -0.4431*** -0.3837*** -0.8696*** -0.4694*** -0.4100*** 
 (19.069)  (17.715)  (17.027) (19.306) (18.110) (17.559) 
Intercept  20.2997*** 11.4300*** 10.1628*** 20.8611*** 11.7646*** 10.4975*** 
 (20.777)  (21.072)  (20.798) (21.359) (20.932) (20.736) 
Obs. NO.  1004 1004 1004 1004 1004 1004 
Adj. R
2  0.335 0.314 0.310 0.342 0.314 0.309 
 
 
Note: *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 34 
Table III, Factor Loadings 
 
This table displays the coefficients of the eight raw scores of governance in their first 
principal component.   
 
 
Variable   Loading 










Table IV, Regression Results of Valuation Measures on the Governance Index 
 
This table reports the estimated coefficients, t-statistics (in parentheses), and adjusted-R
2 
from regressions of Tq, Tq_70, Tq_80, MB, MB_70 and MB_80 on the governance index 
(G-Index). 
 
Panel A: Without control variables 
 
 
 Tq  Tq_70  Tq_80  MB  MB_70  MB_80 
G-Index  0.3214*** 0.2352*** 0.2228*** 0.3241*** 0.2262*** 0.2139*** 
  (7.484) (10.253)  (10.883)  (7.514) (9.451) (10.003) 
Intercept  3.6191*** 2.0488*** 1.8245*** 4.0426*** 2.0463*** 1.8220*** 
  (59.267) (62.812) (62.653) (65.895) (60.112) (59.908) 
Obs.  NO.  1004 1004 1004 1004 1004 1004 
Adj. R
2  0.052 0.094 0.105 0.052 0.081 0.090 
 
 
Panel B: With control variables 
 
 Tq  Tq_70  Tq_80  MB  MB_70  MB_80 
G-Index  0.1268*** 0.1260*** 0.1259*** 0.1250*** 0.1242*** 0.1241*** 
 (3.228)  (5.837)  (6.445) (3.203) (5.858) (6.491) 
ln_sales  -0.7420*** -0.3978*** -0.3486*** -0.7590*** -0.4148*** -0.3656*** 
 (15.187)  (14.817)  (14.352)  (15.634) (15.731) (15.379) 
Capital/Sales  0.0276 0.0065 0.0034 0.0175 -0.0037  -0.0067 
 (1.439)  (0.613)  (0.361) (0.916) (0.355) (0.718) 
Operation 
Income/Sales 
0.0225 0.0090 0.0071 0.0120 -0.0015  -0.0035 
 (1.161)  (0.845)  (0.733) (0.622) (0.147) (0.368) 
Leverage  -1.9854*** -0.6434*** -0.4516*** -2.0828*** -1.7408*** -1.5490*** 
 (6.489)  (3.827)  (2.969) (6.850) (10.541)  (10.404) 
Intercept  18.9876*** 10.0746*** 8.8013***  19.8371*** 10.9240*** 9.6507*** 
 (18.740)  (18.096)  (17.474)  (19.702) (19.976) (19.573) 
Obs.  NO.  1004 1004 1004 1004 1004 1004 
Adj. R
2  0.354 0.347 0.337 0.368 0.413 0.408 
 
Note: (1) Industrial Dummies have been included but are not reported. 
(2) *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.36 
 
Table V Summary Statistics of Tq by Groups   
 
This table presents the summary statistics of Tq by five groups (grades) according to the 
G-Index. Grade one represents the lowest ranking, while grade five the highest ranking. This 
table also reports the result of T-tests on the differentials of Tq between groups.   
 
Panel A: Summary by Grade Groups 
 
Grade    No. of   
Obs.   
Mean   S.D.   Min    Median    Max   
1  200  3.060 1.454 0.988 2.790 10.899 
2  201  3.393 1.763 0.880 3.115 15.102 
3  201  3.491 1.818 1.068 3.033 13.105 
4  201  3.673 1.989 1.034 3.423 12.913 
5  201  4.475 2.493 1.177 3.908 17.992 
Total  1004  3.619 1.987 0.880 3.202 17.992 
 
 
Panel B: T-tests on the Differentials of Tq between Groups.   
This panel runs a T test: whether the mean of Tq in grade=I is larger than that in grade=J 
(where I>J).   
 
  I=2 I=3 I=4 I=5 
J=1 2.065**  2.623***  3.523***  6.944*** 
J=2   0.548  1.491*  5.020*** 
J=3     0.956  4.519*** 
J=4     3.563*** 
 














Figure 1, The Mean Values of Tq for Each Grade
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Table VI Summary Statistics of Tq_70 by Groups   
 
This table presents the summary statistics of Tq_70 by five groups (grades) according to the 
G-Index. Grade one represents the lowest ranking, while grade five the highest ranking. This 
table also reports the result of T-tests on the differentials of Tq_70 between groups.   
 
Panel A: Summary by Grade Groups. 
 
Grade    No. of   
Obs.   
Mean   S.D.   Min    Median    Max   
1  200  1.580 0.727 0.507 1.431 5.286 
2  201  1.912 0.951 0.500 1.791 8.928 
3  201  1.993 0.955 0.665 1.758 6.732 
4  201  2.172 1.137 0.698 1.932 8.267 
5  201  2.584 1.317 0.644 2.181 8.643 
Total  1004  2.049 1.086 0.500 1.787 8.928 
 
Panel B: T-tests on the Differentials of Tq_70 between Groups.   
This panel runs a T test: whether the mean of Tq_70 in grade=I is larger than that in grade=J 
(where I>J).  
 
  I=2 I=3 I=4 I=5 
J=1  3.919*** 4.876*** 6.215*** 9.459*** 
J=2   0.862  2.492***  5.871*** 
J=3     1.706**  5.149*** 
J=4     3.360*** 
 











Figure 2, The Mean Values of Tq_70 for Each Grade
 
 38 
Table VII Summary Statistics of Tq_80 by Groups   
 
This table presents the summary statistics of Tq_80 by five groups (grades) according to the 
G-Index. Grade one represents the lowest ranking, while grade five the highest ranking. This 
table also reports the result of T-tests on the differentials of Tq_80 between groups.   
 
Panel A: Summary by Grade Groups. 
 
Grade    No. of   
Obs.   
Mean   S.D.   Min    Median    Max   
1  200  1.369 0.631 0.396 1.244 4.485 
2  201  1.700 0.847 0.406 1.575 8.046 
3  201  1.779 0.852 0.591 1.586 6.404 
4  201  1.958 1.036 0.636 1.737 7.631 
5  201  2.314 1.171 0.500 1.959 7.308 
Total  1004  1.824 0.975 0.396 1.593 8.046 
 
Panel B: T-tests on the Differentials of Tq_80 between Groups.   
This panel runs a T test: whether the mean of Tq_80 in grade=I is larger than that in grade=J 
(where I>J).  
 
  I=2 I=3 I=4 I=5 
J=1  4.438*** 5.486*** 6.875*** 10.066*** 
J=2   0.94  2.731***  6.025*** 
J=3     1.883**  5.233*** 
J=4     3.232*** 
 










Figure 3, The Mean Values of Tq_80 for Each Grade
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Table VIII Summary Statistics of MB by Groups   
 
This table presents the summary statistics of MB by five groups (grades) according to the 
G-Index. Grade one represents the lowest ranking, while grade five the highest ranking. This 
table also reports the result of T-tests on the differentials of MB between groups.   
 
Panel A: Summary by Grade Groups. 
 
Grade    No. of   
Obs.   
Mean   S.D.   Min    Median    Max   
1  200  3.471 1.466 1.517 3.159 11.228 
2  201  3.835 1.775 1.300 3.494 15.304 
3  201  3.903 1.843 1.521 3.458 13.688 
4  201  4.093 2.013 1.375 3.805 13.314 
5  201  4.909 2.473 1.511 4.307 18.370 
Total  1004  4.043 1.997 1.300 3.608 18.370 
 
Panel B: T-tests on the Differentials of MB between Groups.   
This panel runs a T test: whether the mean of MB in grade=I is larger than that in grade=J 
(where I>J).  
 
  I=2 I=3 I=4 I=5 
J=1 2.236**  2.593***  3.534***  7.083*** 
J=2   0.375  1.361*  5.000*** 
J=3     0.987  4.625*** 
J=4     3.628*** 
 















Figure 4, The Mean Values of MB for Each Grade
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Table IX Summary Statistics of MB_70 by Groups   
 
This table presents the summary statistics of MB_70 by five groups (grades) according to the 
G-Index. Grade one represents the lowest ranking, while grade five the highest ranking. This 
table also reports the result of T-tests on the differentials of MB_70 between groups.   
 
Panel A: Summary by Grade Groups. 
 
Grade    No. of   
Obs.   
Mean   S.D.   Min    Median    Max   
1  200  1.590 0.781 0.438 1.439 5.321 
2  201  1.939 0.994 0.440 1.802 8.923 
3  201  1.982 1.023 0.551 1.785 7.244 
4  201  2.150 1.191 0.381 1.926 8.096 
5  201  2.569 1.334 0.569 2.295 8.918 
Total  1004  2.046 1.125 0.381 1.806 8.923 
 
Panel B: T-tests on the Differentials of MB_70 between Groups.   
This panel runs a T test: whether the mean of MB_70 in grade=I is larger than that in grade=J 
(where I>J).   
 
  I=2 I=3 I=4 I=5 
J=1  3.913*** 4.323*** 5.574*** 8.974*** 
J=2   0.432  1.930**  5.367*** 
J=3     1.514*  4.945*** 
J=4     3.320*** 
 











Figure 5, The Mean Values of MB_70 for Each Grade
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Table X Summary Statistics of MB_80 by Groups   
 
This table presents the summary statistics of MB_80 by five groups (grades) according to the 
G-Index. Grade one represents the lowest ranking, while grade five the highest ranking. This 
table also reports the result of T- tests on the differentials of MB_80 between groups.   
 
Panel A: Summary by Grade Groups. 
 
Grade    No. of   
Obs.   
Mean   S.D.   Min    Median    Max   
1  200  1.378 0.684 0.370 1.253 4.519 
2  201  1.727 0.884 0.389 1.597 8.042 
3  201  1.768 0.913 0.493 1.583 6.916 
4  201  1.936 1.085 0.351 1.742 7.733 
5  201  2.299 1.187 0.522 2.060 7.582 
Total  1004  1.822 1.010 0.351 1.602 8.042 
 
Panel B: T-tests on the Differentials of MB_80 between Groups.   
This panel runs a T test: whether the mean of MB_80 in grade=I is larger than that in grade=J 
(where I>J).  
 
  I=2 I=3 I=4 I=5 
J=1  4.422*** 4.844*** 6.158*** 9.520*** 
J=2   0.46  2.111**  5.474*** 
J=3    1.672**  5.020*** 
J=4     3.202*** 
 










Figure 6, The Mean Values of MB_80 for Each Grade
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Table XI : Average Single Governance Premium for Selected Economics 
 
 
Country Industry  Effect 
Indian Chemicals  10.6 
 Textiles  12.4 
Korea  Auto Parts and Equipment  10.0 
 Textiles  9.8 
Malaysia Building  Materials  10.4 
  Engineering and Construction  10.0 
Mexico Food  11.8 
 Retail  11.8 
Taiwan Electronics  10.7 
 Food  10.7 
Turkey Building  Materials  12.0 
 Food  12.2 
 Textiles  11.8 
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